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11 Introduction
In this paper wc investigate the relationship between housing consumption
and fernale labor supply. We set up a model that breaks down total house-
hold consumption into consumption of housing and consumption of all other
goods, and distinguishes female leisure as a t}rird good. We disregard the
possible importance of investment demand for housing. For a discussion of
consumption versus investment dernancí see e.g. Henderson and Ioanrudes
(1987) or Ioannides and Rosenthal (1994). Since the house is by far the most
important asseL component in the portfolio of home-owners, many studies
(F'olinsky 1977, Henderson and Ioannides 1983) have looked at the demand
for housing and at tentrre choice.
As far as we know, only a few studies have been carried out which investi-
gate the relationship between female labor supply and housing consumption.
Fortin (1995) has examined the effect ofliquidity constraints,in particular
a rnorigage qualification constraint, on the relation between the accumula-
tion of housing assets and female labor supply. Using a life-cycle consistent
model she tests the hypothesis that the labor supply of married womert
is constrained by the household's decisions regarding home-ownership and
the purchase of mortgages. Her main conclusion is that mortgage commit.
ments infíuence the labor supply decisions of married women. Yoshikawa
and Ohtake (1989) have studied personal savings and female labor supply
in Japan in relation to housing demand. 'I'hey consider a three-period ]ife-
cycle mode] for tenants who buy a house in the second period in which they
are assumed to be restricted by a down payment constraint and a model for
tenants who do not buy a house during these three periods. Their analysis
shows that the high house prices in Japan may induce married women in
households with purchase plans to participate in the labor market and work
more hours.
Our set-up is similar to Fortin (1995), but with some variations. The
first variation is due to a difference in institutional environment. Fortin's
study applies to Canadian households, where borrowers have to meet a down
payment constraint (bastd on earnings) on the amount of mortgage they can
take out at all stages of ownershipr. We will use data from the Netherlands.
As in the IQetherlands mortgage contracts typically cover a very long time
span (25 or 30 years), prospective home-owners will primarily be constrainecí
in the year of purchase. I'o model the influence of such a constraint would
require a longitudinal analysis of households starting well before the date
of purchase of a house. Currently, this is bcyond the scope of this paper.
We therefore do not try to model the decision to take out a mortgage on a
~The ]ength of mortgage contracts is typically very short in Canada (around 5 years).
ihouse. Whether or not a household has a mortgage, and how high, is taken
to be determined exogenously. In Fortin's tnodel, the mortgage payments
are also taken to be exogenous. Another difíerence between Fortin's study
and ours is founcí in the sample selection. She restricts her sample to home-
owners only, while we include tenants too, but we model the choice between
rcnting and owning a house in a very simple way. The third major difference
between both studies is the treatment of cronsumption. In our study we dis-
ting~tish betwcen non-housing consumption and housing consumption, while
Fortin does not tnake such a distinction. 'I'herefore we pay special atten-
tion to separability and consider a non-separable utility ftmction of female
labor supply, housing c:onsumption, and non-housing consumption. A con-
ditional demand system with fernale labor supply and other consumption as
thc dependent variables and housing consumption as the conditioning good
is estimated. Fortin estimates a linear expenditure system and compares
the situation in which both spouses' labor income is subjeca to a mortgage
qualification constraint with the situation in which this constraint applies
to the husband's earnings only.
The emphasis of this paper is on the interaction between temale labor
supply ancí housing consumption and we will focus on two points in par-
ticular. The first point is concerned with the influence of earning depen-
dent ]iquidity constraints on the labor supply of women. In the presence of
b[nding liy~~;~lity aonstraints the within period allncatinn nf full expeilditure
between female labor supply and other consumption is affected. Secondly,
we want to test if preferences are separable be.tween housing consumption
and female labor supply. In this paper we will restrict our sample to couples
in which the husband has a job. We will only focus on female labor force
participation because we expect the woman to be able to adjust the number
of hours more easily than her partner. The rnen in the sample generally
work full-time.
This introduetion is followed, in Section 2, by a cíescription of the data
from the Socio-Fconomic Panel, conductE~d by Statistics Netherlands. Fur-
thermore, some descriptive statistics províde prima facie evidence of a rela-
tion between the consumption of housing, mortgages, ancí female labor force
participation. In Section 3 we derive a life-cycle consistent model in which
housing consumption and labor supply is join[ly determined. To allow for
non-separability of female labor supply and housing consumption, we dis-
cuss a female labor supply function conditional on housing consurnption.
The empirical mode] is given in the fourth section. Section i presents the
estimation results. A summary and concluding remarks are providecí in the
ftnal section.
:i2 The description of the data
2.1 The survey
1'hc Socio-Gconomic Yane] (SEP) has been conducted bi-annually from 1984
until 1989 (in April and in October) by Statistics Netherlands. Since 1990
the survey has been conducted once a year, in May. The survey is represen-
tative of the population of Dutch households, excluding those who live in
special institutions such as homes for the elderly and nursing homes. One
wave ccrvers about 5000 households2 and all persons in a household who are
at least 16 years old are regarded as respondents. Both the April and Oo-
tober waves contain information about socio-economic characteristics (e.g.
labor force participation, hours of work), demographic and geographic char-
acteristics. From 1987 onwards the April questionnaires include questions
concerning assets and liabilities. The October interviews collect in particular
information about income and income expectations.
Ftom the April questionnaire we use geographic information and the self-
reported market value of the house owned. 'I'he October wave provides the
data on the household's accommodation, the interest paid on the mortgage,
the redemption, the outstanding mortgage, the rent (for tenants), and other
housing expenses (e.g. water, gas, electricity). The survey does not give
information about property-taxes and imputed rents3. The data on family
composition, education, ernployment status, number of working hours pe3
week, and various income cornponents are taken from the October wave.
2.2 Sample selection
The purpose of this paper is to get more insight in the interaction between
the labor force participation decisions of wornen and housing decisions, in
which we follow Fortin (1995). Her study is based on a cross-section of
Ganadian data of 1986. We decided to use the data of 1989 for the analysis,
because this is the most recent year before the change in set-up of the
questionnaire in 1990. Besides the change in set-up, the CBS decided not
to supply any geographic inforrnation after 1989. Because this information
is necessary for the estimation of our model, we cannot use later waves.
Merging the April 1989 and the October 1989 waves left us with 4709
households. Since we are interested in the possible join[ dec;ision of housing
tenure and the wife's participation in the labor market we have made the
following selection of households. In broad outline this selection is similar
to the selection of Fortin (1995). The main difference is that we include
tenants and exclude self-employed women. We removed 47 households who
~Be(ore 1986, the SEP consisted of only A000 hor,-ceholds.
3Mortgage interest is tax-deductable in the Netherlands, but an imputed rent is added
to a home owner's incorne (or tax-purposes.
.1inhabited a free dwelling. (c.g, an official residence). Married or cxihabiting
women werc inclucícd, whereas single individuals, single-parent families, and
families in which Lhe partncrs are of equal sex were removed. We had to
remove an acíditional "307 houscholds because the information on the partner
was incomplete. Self-employed individuals maximize their profits and do not
receive a regular wage. Since our theoretical mode] is derived from utility
maximizing individuals who mceive wages, we removed 65 households in
which the woman reported to be self-employed. After these selections we
were left with 31:ï9 households in which both the head and the partner
filled in the questionnaire. In nearly a quarter of the remaining households
both head and partner did noL have a paid job. The following jobs are not
regarded as paid jobs: holiday jobs, incidenta] short-term jobs, and working
while receiving unemployment benefits. In 3.2eJo of the 3159 households thc
woman is the solc earner. The rnain reasorts why men stopped working
were health or disability (36.5`70) and (early) retirement (34.5~0). Families
in which the men did not work arc removed frorn the analysis, because our
focus is on the decision of married or cohabiting women to participate in
the labor market, while the husband (ancí Lhus the family) receives a regular
salary. Our working sample thus consists of 2296 households in which the
overall labor participation rate of women was about 451c and the average
number of hours the woman works per week is 24 cornpared to an average
of 41 for men.
2.3 A discussion of descriptive statistics
1'able 1 in the appendix gives the female ]abor force participation rates by
six age classes and three tenures, horne-owners having a mortgage, home-
owners not having a mortgage, and tenants. In this table a distinction is
made between women who are legally married with their partner and those
who cohabit with their partner. The first thing to note from the table is the
low participation of women in owner-families without a mortgage (30.2Q1o)
compared to the other two tenure types (about 46`70). Secondly, the labor
force participation of all women between the ages of 35 and 65 in families
who own a house and have a mortgage is much higher (4~ to 12oIc) [han
among wornen in the other families. Although the sub-sarnple of cohabiting
wornen is small, we see a high participation of these women compared Lo
married women. This simple cross-tabtilation gives a first indication of a
rclationship between tenurc and labor force participation of marricd and
cohabiting women.
Yoshikawa and Ohtake (1989) have pointed out that the high house prices
in Japan may have induced women to participatc in thc labor market. Table
`L does not indicate that there is a positive relation between the value of the
}touse and the number of hours supplic,d by the woman in the Netherlands.
On the other hand column 6 of table 2 presents a non-linear positive rela-
riLion between the number of hours and the mortgage debt relative to total
other family income, which is tota] family incorne exclusive of the woman's
earnings. Women in households with mortgage debts seem to work more.
Also, the table gives some evidence that women in households paying higher
amounts of interest on the mortgage work more. Of course, the direction
of the causality of supplying morc labor ancí the mortgage commitments of
the household cannot be analy~~d from this table. only, but it is clear that
a positive relation exists. Panel data is needed to analyze the direction of
causality, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
In the Netherlands, down payments are not mandatory. In principle each
household can borrow money to finance the purchase of a house. However,
the maximal amount depends on thc gross yearly income and the age of
the heací of the household. In 1992, lending institutions have changed their
policies on this point so that also the wife's income could be taken into
account to determine the borrowing limit. Prospective home-owners can
borrow up to 3 to 4 times their gross yearly income and they will primarily
be constrained in the yearof purchase. Most mortgage contracts cover about
25 to 30 years.
Table 3 presents detailed information on the participation rates and the
mmtber of hours the woman works in different situations characterized hy
the obligation ratio, which is the sum of the interest paid on the mortgage
relative to t~tal other family incomc~ (r) and thr hnme equity as a percentage
of the value of the horne (e). 1'he table shows that on average the labor
rnarket participation rates and the number of hours of work increase non-
linearly in r. In households where the interest payments are rnore than a
quarter of total other family income, women's participation in the labor
market is very high (75.9qe comparecí to an overall average of 43.7`7e). Also
the number of hours are much higher for all values of e. On average we find
a significant increase of 35qe from 17.9 hours to 27.8 hours per week if r rises
from less than 0.1 to greater than 0.25. Even the change from an obligation
ratio between .2 and .25 to an obligation ratio larger than .25 represents an
increase in hours by 13P1o. Regarcíing e, we find that on average the labor
force participation rate and the hours supplied are higher for small values of
the home equity relative to the value of the home. However, this is not true
for all columns separately. Households with a value of the home equity ratio
srnaller than a fourth are likely to be the more receut home-owners. 1'he
women in these householcís work on average 24.8 hours per week compared
to an average of 18.3 hours for women ín households with honte equity ratio
larger than three fourth.
G3 Theoretical model
Our starting point is a simple dynarnic model of female labor supply, housing
consumption and other consumption. Male earnings are taken to be exog~
nous. [lousing consumption will be viewed in the context of the household
production theory (see c.g. Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). In this approach,
it is assurned Lhat the household derives utility from housing consumption
g which is produced through a production function
4-f(b;~) (1)
with 6 a vector of characteristics of the house and B a vector of parameters.
Charactaristics are for example the number of rooms in the house, the age
of the house ot region. It ís not necessarily the case that all dements in b
are choice variables. We will assume Cor instance that the choice of region is
exogenous. We refer to the choice variables in 6 as yt and to the exogenous
variables in b as yi. '['he maximizatiou problem of the household can be
dcscribed as follows.
The household chooses the number of hours the woman works IaJr, the
level of consumption of a composite good representing non-housingconsump-
tion cc, and the level of housing consumption qc, by maximizing expcYted
lifetime utility subject to a prcxiuction function, a lifetime budget constraint,
and an earnings relatecl liquidity constraint.
max Er ~(1 fP)r-TUr(-hJt,~,4r) (2)
-h~.~~r~9.,Ytr r-~
s.t. 9T - !r(br;Br) (3)
~r -(1 f rr-t).`}r t f rn., ~ vrJrhJr - pmc. - pyrbr (4)
~r ? tLa f Wt(mr ~- wtThJr) (~)
0 ~ hJt c l' (g)
Ar-t given AL - 0 (7)
with
7Et expcrc[ation operator conditional on information at time t
Ar wealth at [he e.nd o[ period r
rr interest rate in period r
nzr total family incorne exclusive of the fernale's earnings in period r
w~r after-tax hourly wage rate of woman in period T
ht, hours of work per week of woman in period r
cr composite good representing non-housing consumption in period T
p~r price of the compasite good in period r
qr consumption of housing in period r
b, vector of characteristics of the house in period r
pyT price vector corresponding to br in period r
~r vec[or of parameters corresponding to br in period r
p discount rate, fixed over time
L length of life, Fixed
F time encíowtnertt of the woman, fixed
UT(-h.~T,cr,qr) is the intra-temporal utility function in period r, strictly
concave and monotonically increasing in its argumcnts and the furtction J
is at least one time differentíable to yt.
As implied by the inequality on Ar, we assume that there is an earnings
dependent borrowing constraint. We shotrld stress that this is not a mort-
gage qualificatinn rnnst.raint,. In every perÍOd the borrowing limit is assumed
to depend on income, incauding the labor income of the woman. We expect
the borrowing limit to be inversely related to current earnings; ~it C 0. It
is expected that the constraint is more likely to be binding in cases where
the household has high mortgage commitments, bec:ause the interest pay-
ments on the mortgage are ne.gatively related to income. In these cases, we
argue that the woman in the household can make the liquidity constraint
non-binding by working more.
The inter-temporal additivity of the lifetime utility function greatly sim-
plifies the maximization problem. The first-orcíer conditions for period t
are
U-h - -~tw~t - ~tFzcw~c -~ ut - tcc
U~ - ~t1~ot
Uq - vt
ve aJt - aePv,;e
ayt~c





89c - Ïc(bc; ~c) (13)
Irt(At - rGo -~t(me f wjeh-~e)) - U; ~eh)e - U; ~e(-htc f F) - fi (1'í)
Flc ~ U; vt 1 0; kc ~ 0 (15)
U-h, U,., ancí Uq denote the first-order derivatives of the utility function
with respect to hours, non-housing consumption, and housing consumption
respectively. The variables vt, ac, and ac~ r denote hagrange multipliers,
whereas yc, ut, and rec are Kuhn-Tucker multipliers; vc corresponding to the
production function (3), ac and ~cfr corresponding to the budget constraint
(4), pc corresponding to the liquidity constraint (5) and vc and nc to the time
constraints (6). 'I'he first-order amcíitions (8) can be rewritten as follows
U-n - -acwlt -f rrt - rtic (16)
wherc
Eit
w~t - (1 - ~t ~c )wIt (17)
Note that w~c 1 wJc, because t~r G U. If vt - rct - 0, a labor supply
equation cazr be derived from (16)
h~e - 91(zt~ 1~je, Pce, py, t, y2e, ~) (18)
where ic - p~rcc f~acbc - w ftia~c, i.e. full expenditures in period t. Similarly,
using the first order conditions (9) one obtains
cc - 92(~t, wlt, P~z, Pv~c~ yzc ~ 8) (19)
The demand equation for characteristic j of the house can be derived using
the first order conditions (11)
yr~t - 93~(zn wín Pce, Pv~e, y2e, ~) (2U)
We are particularly interested in female labor supply conditional on xc ,
housing consumption qc - ql, and on the vecaor of charac;teristics yrc -
yie. ~rhese can be obtained in principle by carrying out the maxirnization
program (8)-(15) conditional on q- q'and yr - y~. The implied conditiona]
fimctions are of the form:
hlc - 9i(xi ,~Ic,Pct~ 9i) (21)
ce - 9i(Ti ~ wJc, P~r.9é ) (ZZ)
where zi - P~tct - w~chte
~]3.1 Separability
Many researchcrs have restricted household preferences to bc (weakly) sepa-
rable betwecn goods and leisure. This restriction reduces the set of possible~
utility functions and may simplify the cstirnation procedures. Blundell and
Walker (1982) have addressed the question of separability and they have
concluded that the hypothesis of separability betwcrn comrnocíities and la-
bor supply had to be rejected. In the study of Browning and Meghir (1991)
separability hací to be rejected as we11. Browning and Meghir (1991) havc
presented a new approach to testing for separability and to the estimation
of demand systems under tha alternative of nortseparability. Instead of esti-
mating an unconditional joint commodity cíemand and ]abor supply system
(e.g. Blundell and Walker, 1982), they followecí a conditional approach,
where one considers wmmodity demand conditional on a giveu amount of
labor supply. They mention two advantages. First, their conclusions do not
depend on the correct model specification of the determination of labor force
participation and hours of work. Second, rnore general furtctional forms for
preferences can be used and exact tests for separability are provided. As
mentioned, we are particularly interested in the rclation between housing
consumption and female labor supply. Hence, we wil] Lest for separability
of housing consumption and fernale labor supply. We follow Browning and
Meghir (1991) in their approach and define the intra-temporal conditional
wst function (conditional on housing consumption) as follows
i - c(w!, Pc ~ 9~, u) - hin (Pce - wlhl I U(h7~ c, q~)- u)
i
The timo-subscript has been dropped for notationa] convenience. Given
a conditional cost function, a conditional demand system can be derived,
identical to (21) and ('l2). We use the proposition put forward in Browning
and Meghir (1991) and modify it for our problem with respect to using ui~
instead of w~.
Proposition 1 : Fèmale labor supply (hJ) is weakly sepamble f~ntn housing
consvmptàorz (q) if and only iJ the conditional cost Junction ta6:es the Jorra
x- c(w7, P~,, 9(4, w))-
Ilnder weak separability, concíitioning goods have only inaime effects. If
preferences for hours of work of the female are weakly separable from the
consumption of housing then the right hand side of equation (21) depends
on q orily incGrectly through the dependence of x' on q':
hJ - 9}(x~, wf,P~) (23)
The test for separability then amounts to testing whether the demand
equation for the number of the woman's hours (h~) depends on the quantity
of housing consumption q' other than through x'.
10We only obscrve u~~ for participating women in out data, not w~. In
the next section, we will use the observed wages tn~ and the obligation ratio
instead of w~. 'I'he obligation ratio is assumed to approximate the liquidity
constrained part, ~!,~ á in u,~. In other words, we assume that ~t á does
not depenci on qt.
4 Econometric model
('onsider the following cost function in which the ]og of housing consurnption
y is the conditioning good (sce Stern (1986))
c(u'I ~ 9~, Z, u) -
e-7zwiu - 1a log 4' I- 7,'7a - 7t
log urt } ryl c-7zw~
Ei 2u,
12 ry2 1'2 (y I )
where Z is a vector of socio-demographic variables that may aífect pref-
etences. F:i is the standard exponential integral f?~(er~t)dt. This specifi-
cation for the cast function implies a semi-]og labor supply function4, which
fits the data well:
hJ - 1t log w~ ~- 722~ f 7s 1og9~ -F Z'rya (24)
"I'he demand equation for non-housing consumption follows from adding up
and will cwt he diseussecí furthcr. Our trst fnr sepc~Iability of female labor
supply and housing mnsumption is based on the significance of ry3 in (24).
We specify the stochastic structure of (24) and supplement it with a wage
equation. Though it is possible to cortstruct a consumption measure from
the available data, we have not done this because this measure is relative
noisy. Instead, we use total other family income for x' in the female ]abor
supply function. 7'he labor supply equation and the wage equation together
can be seen as a type 3 tobit mode] (see Amemiya (1985) for details). Female
wages are only observcd if the woman works. Besides, we specify the non-
linear price relation (13). We use the rent5 as a measure for q and consider it
exclusive of expenses on water, electricity, gas, heating, and energy (e.g. oil,
wood), inclusive of any charges for services and a possible antenna system
ancí also inclusive of a rent subsidy possibly received by the households.
Since the rent is only observed for tenants we have also mocíelled the choice
of households to rent or buy'. Equations (27) and (28) below can be seen
"Z'aking into account the fact that wc only ohserve the wage o[ participating
women, a tnore flexible labor supply (unction would complicate the estimation procedure
substantially
s~4'e have not made a distinction between the public housing sector and the private
sector. [n general rents are higher in the private sector.
fiIn the Netherlands, low income hmtseholds may be entitled to a rent subsidy.
~1Ne have not incorporated this discrete choice in our structural model, because that
is beynncí the xope of our paper. The choice lxtween renting and owning is not the main
tocus of this paper.
11as a type 2 tobit modeL A subscript i now indexes the unit of observation.
hjt -~t logwJ: -F ct21og9i ~- zriQ1 -~ u~r (25)
logw~t - zz,~32 f uzt (26)
Zt - aa 1og w~~ ~ za„t3a -1 ua~ (27)
log9: - yi:na f yztr~a ~ ua; (28)
ur;, u2;, u3;,and ua~ are assumcd to be Norrnally distributed random cíis-
turbances with oxpectation 0 and thc elements of the covariance matrix are
o~, oz, 03, aq ,orz, 0~3,ota, az3, aza,and a3a. However, our estimation proce-
dure, explained later, will not make use of this error strucdire explicitly.
No[ice that we have used the sybol 0 for (aq,Q4)' in the theoretical part.
Observations of thc variable hJ„ the actual number of hours per wcek
workecí by fernale i, are censored; we only observe:
- r hJ~ if h~~ ~ 0
hl` - Sl 0 otherwise
Moreover whether one rents a house (7~ - 1) or not (T; - 0) is related
to the latent variable 7~ as follows
~ 1 ifT,'~0
7` - 0 otherwtse
The vector zt in (25) includes total other family income, the female un-
employment rate in the 12 provinces, the socio-demographic variables age
and age squared of the woman, a dummy variable for being married, the
number of children younger than 7, between 7-12, and older than 13. More-
ovcr the vector z~ includes the obligation ratio and its square. As mentioned
beforc, this vatiable is the ratio of the interest payments on the mortgage
to total other family incomeg. We give the following justification for the in-
clusion of thc obligation ratio. In out theoretica] model we allowed for earn-
ings dependent liquidity constraints. We argtred that women in households
with high mortgage commitments, may work more to makc~ thc liquidity
constraint non-binding. In other words, the within period allocation of full
expenditures between female labor supply and other consumption (cf. equa-
tions 'll and 22) is affected by the presence of binding liquidity constraints.
Liquidity constraints are operating if ~t is positive (see also Alessie et al.
(1988)). 'I'he obligation ratio can be seen as a proxy for the presence of bind-
ing liquidity constrainta Thus instead of estimating a model which takes
BWe recognize the pMential problem o( endogeneity of the obligation ratio. The main
rea.wn for as5uming this ratio to be exogenous, LS Lhe lack of good instruments in our
data. [k] 13oca and Lusardi (1996) treat 'having a mortgage' endogenously, while Furtin
(1~5) makes the comment that the problem of endogeneity of mortgage payments does
not appear to be important in her study.
1'linto accounL the liquidity consLraints explicitly, we include the obligation
ratio and its square in the labor supply fimction as an approximation.
"1'he explanatory vaziables in the wage equa[ion are age, education, and
thc female unemployment rates in the 12 provinces.
The vector z3 in (27) includes total other farnily income, the age, age
squared, and age cubed of the head of the household and a dummy for being
rnarried`~.
The fourth e~uation givcs the relation between Lhc log of rent and the
characteristics of the house. }Iousing consumption is scaled so as to be
equal to thc rent paicí. 'I'he theoretical model irnp}ies demand equations for
housing characteristics given in (20). In equation (28) the characteristics
need to be instrurnented according to (20). Thc following spc~cifica[ion for
the characteristic j of the house is used:
y~~i - aa ti log u,~i f záiQa-ti -~ u(atJ)i for j- 1, ... 7 (29)
where ytt is the log of the number of rooms in the house; y12 thc log of
the age of the house; yt3 a dummy for detachc~d house; ytq a dummy for
semidetachcd house; y15 a dumrny indicating whethet or not the house is on
a corner; ylf a durrurry for apartment, and yl~ is a dumnry for the remainder
category. A terraced house is used as the reference category. The vector z~
includes total other family income, a polynornial in the age of the head of
the household and of the woman, a dumrny for being rnarried, the number
of children in the Lhree age classes, dummies for region East, region South,
and region Westto (reference category is region North) and dummies for the
degree of urbanization. We distinguish: rural mtmicipalities, industrializecí
municipalities with less that 20,000 inhabitants, municipalities with more
than 30I comrnuters, small towns having 2,000 to 30,000 inhabi[ants, mid-
dle sized towns having 30,000 to 100,000 inhabitants, ancí large towns having
more than 100,000 inhabitants (reference category ís rural mtmicipalities).
The vector y2 in equatiort (28) includes dummies for region East, South,
and West, and the five durnmies for the degree of urbanization. :1loreover
we include a variable deno[ing the number ot ycars the family has lived at
the same addressll. This variable refiects the fact that tecent horne-owners
may have higher housing consumption than hom~owners who bought their
home some time ago. We assume that the variables in ,y1 influence thc
production of housing consumpt,ion, but they are not choice variables. Given
9'I'he number of children in the three age classes are not included because these variables
do not have a significant effect on the tenure choice.
~oRegion North exists of the prcrvinces Groningen, Friesland and, Drenthe, Region Fa-t
exists of the provinces Overijsel, (',elcíerland and, Flevoland. Region South exists of the
provinces Zeeland, Noord-brabant and, Limburg. Region West exists of the provinces
Noord-holland, "Luid-holland, and Utrecht.
I~IkI l3oca ancí Lrvsardi (1996) use the years of tenure in the current horne as an instru-
ment (or having a mortgage.
13our scaling of housing consumption (by setting it equal to rent for non-home
owners) the production of housing consumption is then more ef6cient in the
North. F'or example, the house prices ancí rents are lowest in the reference
category North. For identification of the model, at least one non-choice
variable on the right hand side of the housing consurnption equation must
be exclucíed from the labor supply equation. The regional dummies and thc
dutnmies for the degree of urbanization are not includecí in the labor supply
equation. P'urthermore, for identification, the female wage rate and total
other family income in the instrutnent equations (29) do not appear in the
housing consumption equation. Einally, the exclusion of the education levels
irt the labor supply function, in the tenant equation, and in the instrument
cquations (29) is used for identification of the model. 'I'able 4 in the appendix
gives tbe mean values and the stancíard deviations of the variables usecí in
the econometric specification.
Our cotnplete modcl exists of I 1 equations. The estimation of the struc-
tural model is not straightforward, mainly because endogenous variables
which are not always observed appear on [he right hand side. 'I'he approach
adopted (for example, see [.ee, 1995) is to estimate the reduced form of this
modcl and apply Minimum Distance Gstimation (í~1DE) to get the sttuc-
tural parameters. The complete model is written in the restricted reduced
form (RRE) as follows:
hji - siió~ f vls (30)
logw7i - ~siió2 f vzi (31)
T' - ~53ió3 i- v3i (3`Z)
ln(r, 9i - S4ió4 ~ v4ti (33)
yr~i - sáióafi f v(af~)i 7- 1,...,7 (34)
where st exists of the variables in z~, zz, yzi and za. sz equals zz. s3
exists of the variables in zz and zz. sa exists of the variables in zzi yzi and
za. s5 exists of the variables in zz and za.
We have appliecí maximum ]ikelihood estimation (~1LE) to equations
(30) and (31) jointly taking into accourtt the possible correlation between the
two equations. Also equations (32) anci (33) are estimatecí jointly by blíd~).
For standardization we have set the variance of v3 to 1. 'I'he wrrelation
between v3 and va is estimated. Least squares estimation (LSE) is applied
to ytt and ytz. The temaining equations are estimated by Pmbit MLE.
We have definecí [he k x k~ selection matrix J~ such that z'J~ - z'~
and the k x G~ matrix .S~ such that z'S~ - s~ (j- 1, ..., 5) and z includes
all k exogenous variables in the model. Ftom (30)-(34~ we obtain the fol-
lowing restrictions between the reduced form parameters ó~ and the'struc-
tural parameters at~ovos,oa - (oat,aaz,....oar)~,oafi,Qt,Qz,Qa,Qa,~jai~
l ~I(J - 1, ..., 7):
ór - aiá2 f a2ba {- Ji~i (35)
óz - Jz~z (36)
ó3 - a3ó2 f J3Q3 (37)
7
óa -~. áa óa~ i f JaQa (38) ~-i ~
ói - oió2 f Js~3i 7- 5,..., 11 (39)
where ói is defined suc:h that 6~Si - á~ for j- 1, ..., 11. Denoting the
estimate of ói by di and defining di such that d'i.Si - d'i, the system (35)-(39)
can bc~ rcwritten as follows:
di -(dz, da, Jt)(ar, 02, l~i)~ f wi - Dr45r f wr (40)
dz -~~2~z f w2 - D2~2 f Wz (91)
d:4 - (d2, J3)(n3, f~3)~ -~ w3 - D3~3 ~ ~.13 (92)
da -(ds,ds,..., drt, Ja)(oá„~a)~ f wa - Da~a ~-~:,a (93)
di -(d2, Js)(ai,Qi) f wi - Di4i f wi 7 - 5, ..., 11 (44)
with
wi
wi -(d, - ài) - or(d2 - ó2) - n2(áa - àa)
~2 - (d2 - ~2)
~3 - (d3 - ó3) - ~3(d2 - ó2)
wa - (da - óa) - ~i-t oai(dati - óaf.i)
- (di - ói) - ~i(dz - óz) 7 - 5, ..., 11
Next we applied LSE to each of the equations (40)-(49) to get prelimi-
nary ~-consistent structural form estimates 4its. S2i - V[fNw~) can bc
estimated with L1~~ using the ~i~s (for details, see Lee, 1995).
The individual IV4DE yhi for yhi is
4i - (L~iwi ~Di) rUiWi ~di
where the matrix Di equals the matrix Di in which the zero rows were
cíeleted and in the covariance matrix Wi we have deleted the zero rows and
colurnns to obtain Wj.
The individual MDE ~ii are consistent, but we can obtain more efficient
estimates by considering the system MDE. Stacking equations (40) to (44)
we get
d - U4 f ~, (45)
15where rl - (d d ' D - dia (D D ) ~ ~ ~ r,..., ti) , g i,..., tt , 4-~4t,...,4tt) , and
w-(w~,...,w~t)' with i:iiSi - ~~. Recause of possible correlations between
the c~i it is more efEicient to estimate (95) than (40)-(44) separately. The
system MDE Q can be obtained as follows
4 - (D~W-t D)-~D'W-id (96)
where S2 - V(~w~ is estimated with W" and
~~-~) - N(0, (D'W- ~D)-t ). The results of (46) can be found in Table
5.
"ló test the restrictions between the recíuced form parameters and the
structural parame[ers as defined in (35)-(39) we usc the followirtg test statis-
tic for c~uation j:
-i - ~di - Di~i)~~I~iW ~Di)-l~di - DirDi) (4ï)
which is asymptotically Xi -~k~t9~l distributed with gi the number of
endogenous variables ittcluded on the right hand side of equation j. And to
test the restrictions between the reduced form parameters and the structural
parameters in all 11 equations jointly, thc following test statistic is used:
- - (d - D4)'(D'W-' D)-' (d - D~) (~8)
which is asymptotfcally Xn- ,,, ~h~trilsutrd with ya - ~~~ t li and m-
~~it~ki f 9i).
5 Empirical results
In this section the results of the estimation of equations (25)-(29) are pre-
sented. Table 5 gives the results of the system MDE estimator defincd in
(46).
'I'hc outcomes ptesented in 'I'able 5 are pretty much according to expec-
tation. 1'he presence of children has the usual negative impact on hours
supplied by the temale in the labor market. As noted before, the sample has
been restricted to cohabiting and legally married couples in which the ma]e
is working. IL is interesting to note the huge negative effect on female labor
supply of being legally married. The significantly negative effect of tmearned
income on hours of work supplied by the female confirms that leisure is a
normal good.
"I'he test for separability of housing consumption and female labor supply
amounts to a test of the significance of housing consumption in the labor
supply equation. We fincí that separability cannot be rejected. In addition,
we notice that female labor supply is significantly affectecí by the amount
of interest the household has to pay on the mortgage. 1'he result of the
positive and significant effect of mortgage commitments on the hotus the
1fifemale works is in line with our arl, 'Ziment that the inclusion of the obligation
ratio can be seen ati a proxy for the presence of liquidity constraintsl~. A
Wald test for the joint siqtificance o[ the obligation ratio and its square
yields a value of the Wald statistic equal to 51.6 indicating that they are
jointly significant.
'I'he wage equation shows the usual positive effect ofeducation on wages.
The negative and sigrrificant effect of female wages and oí other tolal
family income on the choice Lo rent a house shows that families with high
total income wil] choose to buy their home. 1'his is as expected, because
of the advantages of tax cíeductibility of mortgage interest payments for
home-owners.
Regarding the production (unction transfornung house characteristics in
housing consumption, we notice that housing consumption is higher when
the house has rnore rooms and housing consurnption is lower tor older houses,
although these effects are not significant. Of the c}taracteristias, only having
a detac:hed house has a significant and positive effect on housing consump-
tion. However, the test statistic of the Wald test for joint significance of
al] characteristics equals to 65.2, which exceeds the critical value of the chi-
squareci distribution with 7 degrees at any conventional signiFicance level.
This test indicates that the characteristics in the housing consumption equa-
tions are jointly significant. One also observes what might be called an
"euijustmcnt effect". 1~te longer penplr. livg at the same address the lower
is their housing consumption. Conce.ivably, these households' consumption
still reilects past (mostly lower) income. The regional dummies confirm the
generally lower house prices and rents in the North of the Country (the
reference category).
The remaiuing colurnns of 'Pable 5 givc the restilts of the instntment
equations for the characteristics of the house. Finally, the last two rows
of the table give the results of the tests (47) and (48) for overidentifying
restrictions. A high value of the test statistic indicates that the restrictions
in (3~)-(39) are not valid. The test for the restrictions in all 11 equations
jointly indicates that these restriction have to be rejected. This is likely
due to two equations, the overidentifying restrictions in the tenant equation
and in the sixth instrument equation (apartment) are rejected. '1'he critical
value of the chi-squared distribution with fi degrees of freedom at a 5eJo level
is 12.6 and with 4 degre.es of freedom it is 9.5.
12An alternative explanation would be that a high obligation ratio would indicate a low
income, and henceposs~ibly low life time income. If leisure is a norrnal gcwd, this induces
a higher labor supply. Since many households with a high obligation ratio are at the
beginning of the life cycle (so that they may expect their income to rire in the future) we
do not find this explanantion very plausible.
]Í6 Concluding remarks
1'his paper is a first attempt to investigate the relation between housing
consumption and female labor supply using Dutch data. We have restricte,d
our analysis to married ancí cohabiting couples in which the man has a job.
We have derivecí a life-cycle consistent model in which housing consumption
and labor supply is jointly determined. 'I'o test for separability of female
labor supply and housing consurnption, we have considerecí the female labor
supply function conditional on housing consumption. Fhrthcrmore, we have
paid spec:ial attention to the in(luence of liquidity constraints on the labor
supply ofwomen. For that we have included the ratioof interest payments to
t,otal other family income (exclusive of female's earnings) in the female labor
supply function Lo approximate the presence of binding liquidity constraints.
'I'o estimate the mocíel we have made use ot a two-step procedure. In the first
step we have estimated the mduced form parameters and in the second step
we used mirrimum distance estimation to obtain estimates of the structural
parameters.
Housing consumption turned out to be insigrrificant in the labor sup-
ply funetion, indicating that separability between female labor supply and
housing c;onsumption cannot be rejected. The empirical results showed also
that the ratio of interest payments to total other family income has a large
posi[ive eHecl nn the. nu7riber of hours suppliced by the woman, indicating
the presence of liquidity constraints. Morcover the positive eífect of the
obligation ratio is much larger than Lhe negative effect of young children on
female labor supply.
EIousing consumption has been modelled as a scalar variable "produced"
by a production process where house characteristics are inputs. Alterna-
tively, OIIP. COUId set up a model where the house characteristics enter the
utility function directly and an equation like (13) would be interpreted as
hedonic price relation. In the budget wnstraint (4) the term py,br is then
replaced by qr. It turns out that for the econometric model this alternative
interpretation does not make a diffetence.
The results we have presented in this paper rely on a cross-section of
households. As we have mentionecí, prospective home-owners will generally
be constrained in the year of purchase only. To analyre the e(Fect of a con-
straint that households can borrow 3 or 4 times their gross yearly income,
panel data is nmded. A natural extension of this study is to develop a cíy-
namic mode] in which such a constraint can be taken into account. Ihrther,
a dynamic model can be usecí to investigate possible changes in occupa-
tional choice of the wife due to the plans of households to buy a house.
Another important aspect is to check the causality between mortgagc com-
mitments and female labor supply. The results in this paper showed that
high mortgage commitments have a positive eKect on the labor supply of
women. This relation could also be revcrsed: do hotrseholds choose to have
1 í?a high rnortgage cornmitrnent, becausc the wife has a preference for sup-
plying a high ]evel of labor? Using panel data, attention can be paid to
the direction of this causality. Our future research will be focused on the
relation between housing decisions and the occupational choice of the wife
in a dynamic framework taking the points mentionecí above into acwtmt.
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'l0Appendix
Tàble 1: F'emale labor force participation rates by age and family tenure'
Agc of
woman All Married Cohabítation
I(omeowne.rs wíth
a mortgagc
G 24 83.9 78.1 100










55-64 1 l. I
All 30.2 (3'l~ 106)
'1'enants
G 24 76A 64.8 88.5
'LS34 49.0 41.9 87.8
35-14 34.7 4 3.5
4554 32.ri 33.1
55-64 10.8 10.8
All 46.8 (379~809) 40.9 (286~699) 8~1.5 (93~110)
' Lhe ratio of the rmmber of participating women to the total number of
women in any given category ín parentheses. Cells are empty if the total
number of women in the category is less than 10.
llTàble 2: Mcans and standard deviations b}' number of hours the woman works'
rnarket value of rnortgage debt interest paid on
~ the house the mortgage
(1) (2) (3)
nonparticipant 592 163536 (78069) 97332 (64599) 6977 (4485)
0 G hours C 8 57 157842 (62769) 89457 (54738) 6364 (4I00)
8 G hours c 16 95 IS1190 (60658) 93075 (48888) 6784 (3796)
16 G hours G 24 113 175205 (75378) 104588 (.5504.!) 7543 (3956)
24 G hours C 32 76 151908 (60898) 89806 (4491(l) 6899 (3622)
3`L C hours G 4(l 107 156151 (65393) 108328 (50598) 7783 (3805)
hours ~ 40 l l 179182 (50945) 136548 (48137) 10153 (39OD)
all lOSI 161937 (7309.5) 98286 (59267) 7097 (4235)
total other obligation ratio" ('l) ~(4)
~ family income
Í4) Í5) (6)
nonparticipant 592 49114 (21739) 0.145 (0.074) 2.074 (1.608)
0 G hours G 8 57 41611 ( 14294) 0.151 (0.076) 2.139 (1.(Yl5)
8 G hours C 16 95 40154 (10777) 0.170 (0084) 2.3I1 (L07L)
16 G hours G 24 113 43584 (16085) 0.178 (0.085) 2.486 (12'l9)
24 C hours G 32 76 38421 (13563) 0.194 (0.107) 2.583 (1 A35)
32 c hours G 40 107 36294 ( 11967) 0.2'l0 (Q091) 3.122 (1.347)
houts ~ 40 11 43197 ( 8226) 0.242 (0.106) 3.245 (1.241)
all 1051 45162 ( 19149) 0.164 (0.085) 2.300 (L496)
' for home-owners with a mortgage. Standard deviation in parentheses. The
cíifference in the number of observations 1051 compared to 1381 in Table 1
u due to missing v.aluas of the variables in this table. Thc main conlusions
of table 1 do noL changc when the analysis is based on the fewer observations.
" the obligation ratio is the ratio of the sum of interest paid on thc mortgage to
total other family income (this is exclusive of female earnings)
.~.~Table 3: Latwr force participation of marriod and cohabitating women home-owners with a mortgage
Labor force pazticipation (elo)'
Home equity as a percentage r~ G 0.1 Q1 G r G 0.15 0.15 G r G 0.2 0.2 G r G 0.'25 r~ 0.25 all
of the value of the home
e G 0.25 52.2 (12~23) 3AA (22~64) 3'l.7 (37~113) a0.0 (64~128) 72.9 (70~96) 48.3 (20.S~d24)
0.25 G e G 0.50 23.1 (6~26) 36.3 (29~2t0) 38.3 (41~107) 45.8 (22~48) 79.3 ('23~29) 41.7 (121~290)
0.50 G e G 1 28.5 (55~193) 44A (36~81) 62.5 (25~40) 54.5 (6~11) 91.7 (11~L2) 39.5 (133~337)
all 30.2 (73~242) 38.7 (87~225) 39.6(103~2fi0) 49.2 (9'2~187) 75.9 (104~137) 43.7 (d59~L0.51)
Mean hours per week"
Home equity as a percentage r G 0.1 0.1 G r G 0.15 O.LS G r G 0.2 0.2 G r G 0.25 r~ 0.'25 all
oC the value of the home ~
e G 0.25 23.3 (12.0) 23.9 (12.2) 2L5 (12.4) 24.7 (12.4) 27.2 (12.5) 24.8 (12.4)
025 G e t 0.50 22.5 (15.1) 21.5 (ILL) 23.1 (10.5) 23.5 (12.8) 29.1 (11.5) 23.9 (11.6)
0.50 G e c 0.75 15.1 (9.1) 221 (11.3) 26.1 (13.7) 20.5 (14.23) 28.'l (8.7) 22.5 (12.1)
0.75 G e G 1 16.7 (9.2) 21.7 (2.9) 29.0 (12.7) 20.0 (7.1) 32.0 (0) 18.3 (9.5)
all 17.9 (10.5) 2'l.3 (11.2) '23.3 (12.0) 2-t.2 (12.4) '27.8 (11.8) '13.5 (12.0)
' the ratio of the nurnber of participating females to the total number o( females in any given categon' in parenthe~
" standard deviation in pxmuLLri~
~ the obligation ratio r is the ratio of the sum of the interest paid on Lhe mortgage to total family inoome ezcl. of female earningsTable 4: b1eans of variables used in the camometric model of section 4
Variablc Mean S.U.
Agc of woman 37.45 9.58
Age of head of household 39.77 9.51
Zbtal family income excL of female's earningsr 40518 19010
Obligation ratio (home-owne.rs with a mortgage only) 0.16 0.09
lient per year (tenants only) 6085 1966
Vumber of years the famil}' lives at the same address 8.78 7.44
lumber of chilcíren aged (L6z 1.5'l 0.65
Number of children aged 7-Il~ 1.39 0.56
Number of children aged 13 and older~ 1.61 0.74
Regional female unemployment rate (in ore) 5.72 0.99
l~ducation level of woman (0.5) 2-42 0 95
13eing married (0-1) 0.93 0.26
l Iomc-owncr with a mortgage (0.1) 0.6`L 0.49
llome-owner without x rnortgage (0.1) 0 05 0.21
'I'enant (0.1) 0.3:3 047
North (0-1) 0.11 0.32
I.:ast (0-I) 0.22 0.4`l
South (0-1) 0.25 0.43
W~t (0.1) 0.42 0.49
Kurxl municipality (0.1) 0.14 0.34
Industrializecí municipality lcss than 20,000 inhabitants (0-1) 0.25 0.43
Municipality with more than 30q commutcrs (0-1) 0.15 0 36
Small towns: 2,0()0-3(l,Ofln inhabitants (0.1) 0.13 0.33
Middle sized towns: 30,ODO-100,OW inhabitants (41) U.1~! 0.37
Large towns: ]00,000 inhabitants or more (0.1) 0.17 0.37
Uetached house, (0-I) 0.16 0.36
Semidetached house (0-1) 0.15 0.36
Corner housc (0-1) 0.17 0.38
'I'erraced housc (0-I) 0.38 0.49
Apartrnent~flat (0-1) 0.11 0.31
Kemaining category (0.l) 0.03 0.17
Number of tooms in the house 4,64 1.Od
Age ot the house 27,66 24.13
Hourly aftet tax wage o( the womanr~3 13.27 6.64
Number of hours the womau works per week1 24.13 12.02
~ in Uutch guilders
2 conditional on having children in that age class
a conditional on participating in the labor market
247áble 5~ fZesul[s of the 1,9llI: o( the lirst four eyuations in (45)
hours eq wage eq. tenant eq. houacons. eq.
coefï. t-vxl coeff. t-val coeff. t-val coeff. t-val
ln (wage) 50.336 4 37
ln (houscons.) 1.139 012
-L201 -3.96
constant -69.270 -1.66 1.754 8.53 9.074 4.70 3.888 5.956
age head ~10 -3.794 -2.69
age head Z ~1,000 8.784 2.63
age hexd ; ~ 10,0(l(l -6.582 -2.57
othcr inc. ~1,00(l -15.769 -317 -L297 -14.68
age ~10 -0.126 -0.01 0.362 3.64
age 2 ~1,0OU -12.537 -0.95 -0.399 -3.18
married -15.290 -3.79 -0.234 -1.78
~ children age 0-6 -12.058 -6.56
~ children age 7-12 -7.951 -4.5'l
~ children age 7 l3 -0.921 -0.51
obligation ratio- 32.698 2.63
obligation ratio 1 13.572 0.39
c~ucation Ievel 2 0.026 0.80
education leve.l 3 0.133 4.19
education level 4 0.287 7.42
aíucation level 5 0.524 5 01
unemployment rate -2 181 -2.31 -0.014 -1.01
chnrncteristics:
~ rooms 0.283 O.G6




corner housc 0.018 0.17
apartment~flat -0.134 -1.61
remaining category -0.047 -(1.61






industrialized 0.053 0 91
~ 3(~Io commuters 0.307 3.14
small towns 0.268 2,61
middle si~ed towns 0.265 3.03
large towns 0.230 2.19
overidentifying
restrictions test: ~~ 6.04 (14 df) 0(0 df) 40.98 (6 d[) 2.80 (8 df)
model: ~ 76.68 (56 df)
Z;i~`able 5: Results (cont.) of the M11DF~ o{ tl'~e instrument equations, i.e. equatiuns S11 in (-15)
~ rooms age house detachod semi-ríetac~hed corner apartment rernaining
cceff. t-val cceff. t-val cceff. t-val cceff. t-~xl coeff. t-val coeff. t-val coeff. t-aal
ln (wage) 0.1-td 2.96 -0.383 -1.83 0.597 1.77 0.958 '2.83 0.275 0.83 -0.91'2 -2.28 0259 0.'ld
constant O.d90 3.03 4.2ï0 3.37 -2.575 -1.09 -5.154 -1.89 0.727 0.28 5.299 1.81 -.5.16 -0.94
other inc. ~1,000 0.119 7.2G -0.'l96 -4.29 0.595 5.79 Q151 1.43 0.015 0.38 -O.SId -3.12 -0.065 -0.25
age ; 10 0.032 0.47 0.230 0.75 Q.123 0.86 O.ad'2 0.79 -0.626 -1.11 -0248 -0.37 -1.a71 -1.37
age z ~1,000 -0.018 -0.22 -0.26fi -0.7.5 -0.471 -081 -0.595 -0.89 0.877 1.24 -0.059 -0.07 1.818 l.St
married 0.022 0.90 -0.~129 -4.52 O.IX).5 0.03 02:38 1.15 0.464 '2.84 -0..539 -3.37 -O.ldB -0.a5
~ children age 0-6 0.049 7.6'l 0.063 1.99 -0.032 -0.68 -0.012 -0.`21 (1.006 0.1'l -Q15 -2.02 0.036 (1.33
~ children age 7-L'l 0.043 6.~12 0.043 1.23 -0.081 -1.43 0.045 Q74 -0.076 -1.27 -0.23 -'221 -0.004 -0.03
~ children age 1 13 0.046 6.29 0.03'l 1.23 -0.110 -2.30 -OA35 -0.68 0.001 0.01 -0.029 -0.42 0.1.l8 1.39
age head ~10 -0.015 -0.07 -0.575 -0.63 -O.SlB -0.29 0.554 0.27 -1.291 -0.67 -'2.518 -1.15 3.977 1.04
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